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Abstract. Secured communication has been widely deployed to guaran-
tee confidentiality and integrity of connections over untrusted networks,
e.g., the Internet. Although secure connections are designed to prevent
attacks on the connection, they hide attacks inside the channel from be-
ing analyzed by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Furthermore, secure
connections require a certain key exchange at the initialization phase,
which is prone to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks. In this paper,
we present a new method to secure connection which enables Intrusion
Detection and overcomes the problem of MITM attacks. We propose to
apply Identity Based Encryption (IBE) to secure a communication chan-
nel. The key escrow property of IBE is used to recover the decryption
key, decrypt network traffic on the fly, and scan for malicious content. As
the public key can be generated based on the identity of the connected
server and its exchange is not necessary, MITM attacks are not easy to
be carried out any more. A prototype of a modified TLS scheme is im-
plemented and proved with a simple client-server application. Based on
this prototype, a new IDS sensor is developed to be capable of identifying
IBE encrypted secure traffic on the fly. A deployment architecture of the
IBE sensor in a company network is proposed. Finally, we show the ap-
plicability by a practical experiment and some preliminary performance
measurements.
1 Introduction
Secured communication has been widely deployed to guarantee confidentiality
and integrity of connections. To achieve this, cryptographic techniques are usu-
ally applied to secure the connections, e.g., hash algorithms to secure integrity,
asymmetric encryption to secure key exchange, and symmetric encryption to se-
cure confidentiality. Various implementations have emerged and are widely used
in practise, such as SSL/TLS [1] and IPSec [2] which provide encryption at the
transport layer and the internet layer. Additionally, a connection can also be se-
cured on the application layer, e.g., simple E-Mail encryption using PGP [3] or
XML Encryption. Although secure connections are designed to prevent attacks
on the connection, they hide attacks inside the channel from being analyzed by
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Furthermore, secure connections require a
certain key exchange to work properly. For instance, TLS requires the exchange
of a public key between a client and a server, which is prone to Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attacks [25,26].
Effective prevention of attacks on the communication, e.g. IDS and anti-
virus, needs to either check the channel or the aplication layer data on the wire,
which leads to several problems. The first problem is performance, as both a
network-based IDS sensor and anti-virus software have to analyze large amounts
of data in a short time. The second problem is detection in the encrypted traffic.
Securing connections by encryption (e.g. SSL/TLS, IPSec, PGP) render the
network based IDS and anti-virus software useless, as it is not able to decrypt and
to recognize malicious data inside encrypted communication. On the other hand,
most of existing cryptography based secure communication require unsecure key
exchange at the initialization phase. It is not difficult for attackers to exploit
this phase and get the keys by carrying out a MITM attack.
In an Identity-Based Encryption[12] (IBE) scheme, the public key of the
user is derived from its unique identity, e.g., email address or IP address. The
Trusted Authority (TA) or the Key Generation Center (KGC) generates the
corresponding private keys. Thus, IBE does not require a digital certificate to
certify the public key. Key escrow is an inherent property in IBE systems, i.e.,
the TA can generate each users’ private key, because the TA owns the master
key MK used to generate users’ secret keys. This property can be useful for IDS
to decrypt network traffic on the fly and perform content scanning on encrypted
traffic.
In this paper, we present a new method to secure connections which provide
capabilities for Intrusion Detection and overcome the problem of MITM attacks.
We propose to apply IBE to secure communication channels. By integrating
the TA in the IDS sensor, it is possible to use the key escrow property for
decrypting network traffic on the fly and scan for malicious content. In this way,
we can detect malicious content in encrypted network stream without knowing
the original private key of the receiver, which can be created on runtime using
the master key. The decryption and detection are performed using an IBE sensor.
As the public key can be generated based on the identity of the connected server
and its exchange is not necessary, the method is not prone to MITM attacks any
more. To verify our concept, we implement a prototype of a modified TLS scheme
with a simple client-server application. Based on this prototype, we develop a
Snort Preprocessor to recognize and decrypt IBE secured traffic on the fly. A
deployment architecture of the IBE sensor in a company network is proposed.
Finally, we show the applicability by a practical experiment and preliminary
performance measurements. The contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
1. A new mechanism to secure connections, which enables detection of malicious
traffic and prevents MITM attacks, is proposed.
2. A modified TLS scheme is implemented.
3. A Snort preprocessor is realized to support detection in IBE secured con-
nections.
4. Practical experiments and preliminary measurement results are presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the related work,
including an overview on secured connections and the IBE encryption scheme.
In Section 3, we describe a modified TLS scheme based on IBE. In Section 4, we
propose an important application of the IBE scheme for IDS. Section 5 covers the
implementation details of the modified TLS as well as the IBE sensor. In Section
6, we shortly describe the experiments based on our prototype implementations
and the results of the performance measurements. After some suggestions for
future work in Section 7, the work is concluded in Section 8.
2 Related Work
2.1 Secure Network Connections
As the successor of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS)
is a cryptographic protocol that provides integrity, confidentiality, and authen-
ticity for network communications on the transport layer of the TCP/IP protocol
stack [1]. It consists of the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Pro-
tocol. The TLS Record Protocol uses symmetric encryption and a negotiated
secret key to secure the connection, e.g., RC4, Triple DES, AES, IDEA, DES,
or Camellia. Furthermore, it uses hash functions to guarantee the integrity of
a message, e.g., HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA. The TLS Handshake Protocol
allows server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate protocol
parameters, such as an encryption algorithm and the cryptographic keys. The
identity can be authenticated using asymmetric crypto algorithms, e.g., RSA,
DSA, or ECDSA. For key exchange, different algorithms can be used, such as
RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDH, SRP, or PSK [5].
The TLS Handshake Protocol provides the negotiation of the parameters nec-
essary to establish the secure connection. The used crypto protocols being used
as well as the related keys are communicated. During the handshake, at least the
server is being authenticated (client authentication is also possible). The TLS
handshake starts when a client requests a secure connection from a TLS enabled
server. As next step, the client presents a list of supported ciphers and hash
functions. The server selects the strongest cipher and hash function available by
matching own supported functions and finally negotiates the parameters. Fur-
thermore, the server sends its identification in the form of a digital certificate,
e.g., an X.509 certificate, which contains the server name, the trusted certifi-
cate authority (CA), and the server’s public key Kspub. The client and server
exchange the random numbers Rc and Rs to resist replay attacks. After verifi-
cation of the certificate, the client encrypts a premaster secret PMS with the
server’s public key Kspub: E(PMS,Kspub) and sends it to the server, which
decrypts it with its private key Kspriv: E(PMS,Kspriv). Based on PMS, Rc,
and Rs, the server and the client generate the master secret MS, which is used
for encryption of the connection MS = genkey(Rc, Rs, PMS). This procedure
can be illustrated as follows:
1. Negotiation of encryption and hashing algorithms for client and server and
random numbers Rc and Rs
2. Transmission and verification of certificate including Kspub
3. Exchange of Rc and Rs
4. Encryption and transmission of PMS: E(PMS,Kspub)
5. Generation of MS based on Rc, Rs, and PMS:MS = genkey(Rc, Rs, PMS)
Even if the handshake is sniffed, the confidentiality of the messages is pre-
served, as the master key MS is impossible to be obtained by the attacker. Thus,
attacks inside a secured channel can not be realized. However, the SSL/TLS pro-
tocol is prone to MITM attacks [25,26]. The attacker intercepts packets between
the client and the server to establish two encrypted connections: 1) a connection
between the client and the attacker and 2) a connection between the attacker and
the server. The attacker generates its own public key and modifies the original
certificate to trick the user/client, which is even possible without a capability for
the user to notice the attack [25]. By doing this, the attacker can read the traffic
of the secured connection between the client and the server. To get position of
a MITM, the attacker can use well known techniques, such as ARP Spoofing,
DHCP Fake, DNS Spoofing, or ICMP Redirects [27].
To increase the system performance, the SSL scheme can be supported by SSL
acceleration [17]. SSL acceleration is implemented by a hardware crypto device
which processes the SSL handshake and in some cases the symmetric decryption.
Such devices are optimized for cryptographic operations and offer a very high
performance. The crypto device can be installed on the secured server to decrease
excessive load on the server. There are also dedicated SSL acceleration appliances
which can be placed in the network to perform SSL decryption and encryption.
In this case, the SSL accelerator works as a proxy and provides encrypted SSL
traffic to the external network, and decrypted traffic to the internal network.
There are different accelerator devices available for deployment in a company’s
network, e.g., Array SPX1800 [18], AppXcel [19], and IBM Crypto Cards [20].
2.2 ID-based Encryption Scheme
The idea of generating users’ public key from the identity was proposed by
Shamir [11], and the first practical scheme was given by Boneh and Fraklin
[12].The Boneh-Franklin scheme consists of four algorithms:
1. Setup(k) : Run by the TA, given a security parameter k, the algorithm
generates two cyclic groups G and G1 of prime order p, a generator g of G,
a bi-linear map eˆ : G × G → G1, a master secret key MK = α ∈ Z∗p, and
the hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H2 : G1 → {0, 1}n. The publicly
available system parameters are params = (G,G1, p, g,H1, eˆ,PKTA), where
PKTA = gα is the public key of the TA.
2. Extract(ID) : Run by the TA, the algorithm takes as input an identifier ID,
and outputs the private key SKID = PKαID, where PKID = H1(ID).
3. Encrypt(m, ID) : Run by the message sender, the algorithm takes as input
the message m and an identifier ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs the ciphertext
c = (c1, c2) where c1 = gr, c2 = m⊕ H2(eˆ(PKID,PKTA)r), where r ∈ Z∗p.
4. Decrypt(c, skID) : Run by the message receiver, the algorithm takes a input
the ciphertext c = (c1, c2), and the user’s secret key SKID, and outputs the
message m = c2 ⊕ H2(eˆ(SKID, c1)).
3 A Modified TLS Protocol for IBE Secured
Communication
In IBE scheme, if the TA intercepts the communication between Alice and Bob,
the TA can decrypt the encrypted data sent from Alice to Bob, and vice versa.
For example, when Alice sends an encrypted email to Bob, Alice, firstly, generates
Bob’s public key: PKBob = H1(bob@mail.com), and then sends the encrypted
data: c1 = gr, c2 = m ⊕ H2(eˆ(PKBob,PKTA)r) to Bob. A Trusted Author-
ity(TA) intercepting the communication between Alice and Bob, can compute
c2 ⊕H2(eˆ(PKαBob, c1)) to reveal the message m. In practice, the message m can
be a virus, a trojan horse, a worm, etc, which can not be detected in encrpyted
form. It is expected to use IBE for securing the emeail communication so that
the TA can be used to decrypt encrypted ciphertext and make it possible to scan
them for malicious code.
By providing a modified TLS scheme, it would be possible to also use IBE to
secure connections on the network. Modification of the TLS specifications and
implementation is necessary, as both do not support the IBE scheme. A possible
modification can be done by introducing IBE as supported encryption method
and modifying the TLS handshake to use IBE during parameter negotiation.
Introducing IBE as encryption method is needed as there are no easy ways to
deploy encryption methods at runtime or add encryption methods unknown to
TLS. Modifying the TLS handshake in case of IBE as encryption method is
reasonable as a certificate providing the public key is not needed any more. The
public key could be derived from the identity of the server, which needs to be
provided. The identity of the server could be the URL or the IP of the system.
So the client could directly encrypt the PMS messages with the identity derived
key of the server. The scheme looks as follows:
1. Negotiation of algorithms to use and exchange Rc and Rs
2. Generation of IBE public key Kspub based on the identity of the server IDs:
Kspub = genkey(IDs)
3. Encryption of the pre-master-secret PMS: E(PMS,Kspub) with the public
key Kspub and transmission to server
4. Generation of MS based on Rc, Rs, and PMS:MS = genkey(Rc, Rs, PMS)
The key escrow property is used to achieve IDS capabilities, i.e., decrypt-
ing network traffic on the fly and scan for malicious content. In this way, we
can detect malicious content in encrypted network stream without knowing the
original private key of the receiver, which can be created on runtime using the
master key. The decryption and detection are performed using an IBE sensor.
As the exchange of the certificate is not needed, the attacker has no chance to
forge the certificate and the corresponding public key as a MITM. The client
will generate the public from the identity of the server and will directly encrypt
the session key with this public key. The attacker can intercept this message,
but he is not capable of reading the encrypted session key. Thus, a MITM attack
to establish two secured channels that appear as one to client and another one
to the server can not be performed. He still can disturb the connection, but the
confidentiality and integrity of the communcation are secured. The only require-
ment is that the parameters of the cryptosystem are known before. This can be
achieved by a similar method as the distribution of trusted certificates for TLS.
4 Detecting Intrusions in the modified TLS
Communication
The modified TLS protocol makes it possible to detect intrusions in encrypted
communication channels. To realize this, the IBE supported IDS sensor (which
is called IBE Sensor) is required. We apply the proposed modified TLS in some
normal services deployed in a typical enterprise network with a demilitarized
zone (DMZ) and the internal subnet. In the internal network, there are several
connected clients and the PKI infrastructure for IBE. Within the DMZ there
are several servers running, providing services for internal and external clients.
To support IBE, there are private keys SKPi deployed on all servers and CKPi
deployed on clients in the network. These private keys are derived from the
master key MK. The deployed IBE sensor should be able to read all incoming
and outgoing network traffic in the DMZ as well as traffic in the internal network.
Using the master key MK it would be possible to decrypt the traffic which
is encrypted based on the IBE scheme. If the modified TLS scheme is used,
the runtime decryption works by extracting the master secret from the TLS
handshake while sniffing all network traffic. This is achieved using the following
steps:
1. Recognize negotiation of algorithms and exchange of Rc and Rs (store Rc
and Rs)
2. Recognize encrypted pre-master secret E(PMS,Kspub) on the network and
decrypt it with master key MK: D(E(PMS,Kspub),MK) = PMS (store
PMS)
3. Generate MS based on Rc, Rs, and PMS:MS = genkey(Rc, Rs, PMS)
4. Use MS to decrypt the encrypted traffic
As this method is passive, no server or client would be disturbed during its
communication. The IBE sensor does not need to intercept and forward traffic,
but it needs to store information about the TLS session to assign network traffic
to a specific connection/TLS session and a related master secret MS.
The distribution of the master key MK yields additional risks for the net-
work. As the master key MK is able to decrypt any traffic within the network,
it might be a main target for attackers. While the risk for a PKI is known and
confined by security mechanisms, the possible risks for an IBE sensor are higher
as it is exposed to any traffic on the network. Furthermore, the IBE sensor relies
on traffic parsers which might be vulnerable to different kinds of attacks, e.g.,
Buffer Overflows or Format String Exploits [6]. To secure the IBE sensor and
the master key MK, additional security measures need to be realized. By suc-
cessfully attacking the IBE sensor, the attacker will be able to passively sniff all
encrypted traffic on the network. With knowledge on the identities, the attacker
will be able to generate the private keys and to send falsified messages with a
spoofed identity.
Fig. 1. IBE Sensor Secured Client-Server Communication
5 Implementation
The proof-of-concept implementation consists of two parts: the implementation
of a modified TLS specification and the implementation of an IBE-supported
Snort IDS sensor (IBE sensor). The modified TLS is implemented between a
client and a server. The communication between the client and the server is en-
crypted based on a session key, which is securely exchanged during the session
negotiation by using the IBE encryption scheme. The Snort IDS sensor is mod-
ified to recognize this session negotiation and restore the session key based on
the key escrow property.
Figure 1 shows the communication between the client and the server secured
by the modified TLS scheme. The scheme consists of two separated phases:
the session negotiation and the encrypted session. The initial state is a server
listening for connections. After the client connects to the server, it receives the
banner and creates a random session key key iv. Then it encrypts the key iv with
the identity of the server based on IBE and sends it to the server. The server can
decrypt the session key with its private key based on IBE and acknowledge that
the session is established. In the following, the client sends multiple encrypted
messages to the server. The session is encrypted based on the symmetric Blowfish
cipher[23].
An IDS sensor consists of a detection engine, a reporting engine, and a com-
prehensive rule set for detection. The Snort IDS sensor provides several extension
possibilities realized by so called Dynamic Modules [4]. Dynamic modules can
be additional detection rules for the existing detection engine, a new detection
engine, or so called Preprocessors. A Preprocessor is a configurable software
component in the Snort architecture, which is called before the detection en-
gine. After the packet has been processed by all preprocessors, it is given to
the detection engine to be scanned in detail according to the configured rule
sets. To decrypt the TCP stream on the fly before detection, we implemented a
Preprocessor, which is capable to recognize the modified TLS scheme in a TCP
stream.
As shown in Figure 1, the modified Snort can be used to detect attacks in a
TCP stream which is encrypted by the modified TLS scheme. To identify a new
session, the IDS recognizes the session negotiation, which is sent by the server.
The next information sent by the client is the encrypted pre-master secret PMS,
which can be decrypted by IDS using the master key. By using the extracted
PMS, the IDS can calculate the session key as well as decrypt and analyze all
the network traffic in this session. For this purpose, the Preprocessor gets all
packets in this session, decrypts it, and modifies the packet on runtime to make
it being analyzed by the detection engine. The implementation is done in plain C
with support of the OpenSSL library for symmetric encryption and decryption.
The session negotiation is implemented on the client and server based on the
Stanford IBE implementation [24].
6 Experiment Results
In the experiment scenario, there are several clients and an attacker host con-
nected to the external network, e.g., the Internet. The internal network is at-
tached to the external network using a firewall. The IBE sensor is configured to
monitor the internal network and to hold the master key, which is used to gener-
ate the server keys SKP1 to SKPm. In the internal network there is a server to
hold SKPm and has the identity “server@hpi“. The clients can connect to this
server using the modified TLS scheme, which secures the communication session
based on IBE and Blowfish. The sensor is running with an Intel(R) Core(TM)2
Duo at 1.4GHz, i.e., it includes two dedicated cores with 3.072KB of cache
each. The system has 2GB of RAM.
During the experiment, we have several clients sending encrypted messages
to the server based on the modified TLS scheme. Since he/she can pretend to be
a normal user, the attacker is also using the modified TLS scheme to establish a
session with the server. Additionally, the attacker tries to send malicious content
(e.g., x86 shellcode) to the server within this encrypted session. As the traffic is
encrypted based on a session key, the unmodified Snort sensor can not read it and
therefore can not detect the shellcode. By using the IBE sensor, which recognizes
the session negotiation, we can detect the shellcode within the encrypted session.
The attacker sends shellcode to the server within the encrypted session. This
shellcode could be used to exploit the server without being detected by an IDS
sensor. The IBE sensor decrypts the session and finds the malicious shellcode
in the network traffic. The output is the Snort alert file, which contains the de-
tected attacks on the wire. We also tested other content-based detection rules
with the prototype, such as the Backdoor Rules used to detect backdoor com-
munication on the network or the Attack Response Rules used to detect special
responses given by successful attacks [4]. All the tested rule sets worked fine for
our prototype.
6.1 Performance Analysis
To test the performance of our implementation, we measured the processing
time in the Snort implementation while sending 10 messages with different size
from the client to the server. To compare the results, we distinguished three
different scenarios. The scenarios are chosen to give a first impression on the
performance of the approach. The message sizes in the real world depend on the
actual application scenarios:
1. Small size message content - 10 messages each with 20 Bytes
2. Medium size message content - 10 messages each with 80 Bytes
3. Large message content - 10 messages each with 480 Bytes
We analyzed the results for the key negotiation and the encrypted session
separately, to avoid confusion. Finally, Table 1 shows the average values of the
processing time comparing the different scenarios, the key negotiation and en-
crypted session, as well as the processing of Snort with and without runtime
decryption. The average of packets during the key negotiation is similar across
different scenarios. While the processing time of the packets without runtime
decryption is around 35 micro second, the processing time with runtime decryp-
tion is around 3600 micro seconds. This is reasonable as the IBE decryption
process during the key negotiation needs a lot of additional effort. Furthermore,
the effort is the same for the three different scenarios, as the messages which
are exchanged during the key negotiation are basically the same. Comparing
the processing times of the packets in an encrypted session, one can realize that
the average without runtime decryption is around 28 micro seconds, while the
processing time with runtime decryption depends on the message size. The ex-
periment shows the significantly higher processing time of the scenario with large
size message content, i.e., 480 Bytes per message. Each encrypted packet needs
between 110 and 1250 micro seconds to be processed. The processing time of
the scenarios with small size and medium size messages is similar, i.e., between
180 and 210 micro seconds. This can be explained by the functionality of the
Blowfish cipher, which is a block cipher. A clear text message is padded to a
specific block size (or a multiple of it) to be encrypted with this cipher. The
default block size of the Blowfish cipher is 64 bits while our encryption uses 128
bits cleartext blocks to be encrypted. The message size of the two scenarios is
padded to the same block size, which needs the same amount of processing time.
Therefore, the processing time for both scenarios appears to be the same.
Table 1. Performance Table: Average Snort processing time in milli seconds (ms)
7 Future Work
As the concept shows promising results, the integration of IBE into the real TLS
standard should be considered in the future. Besides the evaluation of the ap-
plicability, it includes the modification of supported and well-known implemen-
tations, such as OpenSSL. In addition to our preliminary measurement results,
the performance needs to be analyzed in detail and the scheme can be optimized
accordingly to ensure scalability. A possible approach to improve performance
can be the utilization of hardware devices to support cryptographic operations
for the IDS, e.g., the expensive pairing operations and the symmetric decryp-
tion. This could improve the performance and make our approach applicable
for huge network environments. The described attack countermeasures does not
work with Snort in In-line mode [4], a specific operation mode where Snort is not
separately deployed in the network. In this way, the sensor can drop malicious
packets directly while the sensor itself is exposed to the network and to potential
attackers. In this case, further security mechanisms are necessary to secure the
master key as well as the sensor itself from being compromised.
Moreover, it could be interesting to analyze the utilization of Attribute Based
Encryption (ABE)[13] for secured connections. ABE is a generalization of IBE,
and differs from IBE such that the user in ABE get a secret key associated with
a set of attributes, while in IBE the user gets a secret key associated with an
identity. Same as IBE, the ABE key escrow is an inherent property since the
master key is used to generate each user secret key. A suitable ABE scheme for
being applied in IDS is Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE)[15],
since it is related to the concept of searching on encrypted data, in which a server
on behalf of the user can make a query on the encrypted data without knowing
the query and without knowing the plaintext.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new mechanism to create secured connection based
on IBE. By using the key escrow property, the secured connection can be recov-
ered and the network traffic is possible to be analyzed by IDS. In this way, we
can detect malicious content in encrypted network streams without knowing the
original private key of the receiver. Additionally, the secure connections based on
IBE have no need to exchange public keys in certificates, which prevents MITM
attacks on the secured channel. We provide a deployment architecture of the
IBE sensor in a company network. Furthermore, we implemented a prototype of
a modified TLS scheme with a simple client-server application to support IBE.
Based on this prototype, we developed an IBE sensor (i.e., Snort Preprocessor)
to recognize and decrypt IBE secured traffic on the fly. Finally, we showed the
applicability by a practical experiment and analyzed the performance of our
implementation.
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